

The Causes and Origins of the Ekiiti-Paraapo War

Buhari Lateef Oluwafemi

Department of History and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, Ekiti State University, Ekiti, Nigeria
Email: lateef.buhari@eksu.edu.ng, latfem4real@yahoo.com

Abstract:

The Ekiiti-Paraapo War, also known as the Kiriji War, was a 16-year civil war that split the Yoruba people into two subethnic kingdoms: the Western Yoruba, which included primarily the Ibadan and Oyo-speaking Yorubas, and the Eastern Yoruba, which included the Ekiti people, the Ijesha people, the Ijebu people, and others. The study examines Ajele's leadership, the root causes of the Ekiti-Parapo War, both immediate and distant, and the strategies used by the War Chiefs. The analysis also demonstrates that Imesi-Ile served as the Civil War's focal point. Many primary and secondary sources, including books, journal articles, and other scholarly publications that are pertinent to the topic are widely consulted in this study. It also gains from the vast knowledge and wisdom of old leaders and intellectuals in the Ekiti region. According to the study's findings, the effects of the conflict caused a concentration of Yoruba people in numerous cities and towns in Yorubaland, many of which are still standing today.

Keywords:

Yoruba; Ekiti; traditional armies; Kiriji war; Ajele System

I. Introduction

The Ekitiparapo War, often referred to as the Kiriji War, lasted from July 3, 1877, to March 14, 1893, and was the Yorubas' longest civil war. The Yoruba sub-ethnic kingdoms that were separated between the western Yoruba, which mostly consisted of the Ibadan and Oyo-speaking Yorubas, and the eastern Yoruba, which included the Ekiti people, the Ijesha, the Ijebus, and other groups, fought each other in the Kiriji War. The Ekitiparapo Confederacy was made up of the eastern Yoruba people. The fall of the Old Oyo Empire and the fight for control in Ibadan are credited with starting the conflict.

According to Soetan, Ibadan's rise was a result of the previous Oyo Empire's decline. The Oyo Empire's decline and final demise were signalled and expedited by Bahorun Gaha's uprising against the Alaafin. The Afonja's subsequent rebellion and demise forced the Fulani rulers of Ilorin to launch a systematic jihadist invasion of the Oyo Empire. The new refugee states, namely the Ibadan and the Ijaye, were tasked with defending the Oyo Empire against Ilorin. Ibadan opposed Ilorin in the eastern Osun districts while Ijaye guarded the areas west of the Ogun River. Ibadan defeated Ilorin and Oshogbo with ease in 1840. On a riverbank in Ila, Osun State, known as Odo Oti in the Oti local government area, a battle known as Ogunjalumi took place (2005: 3). He claimed that because Ekiti and Ijesa were not a part of the Oyo empire, they were untouched by the political unrest that plagued the Oyo empire in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Apart from the fact that many Oyo refugees came to reside in Igbomina and Ekiti towns, they were unaffected by political upheaval. Ibadan prevented the Ilorin force from travelling south, so they turned east and entered the Igbomina, the Ekiti, and the Ijesa. The majority of the Igbomina towns and villages were easily taken over by them, but in the far north of Ekiti, they encountered the Otun who was a

barrier to their progress. On the other side, the Otun are well informed of their plan, which makes it much simpler for them to capture the terrorist from Ilorin. The Otuns' resistance, though, ensured that the Ilorin invasion of Ekiti and Ijesa never stood a chance of lasting success. Tsetse flies and the challenging terrain made it impossible for cavalry soldiers and their horses; they fell ill and died, helping the otun beat the jihadists (2005: 3).

Ibadans wanted to exact revenge for the humiliations they had suffered as a result of the territory they had taken from their headquarters in Ilorin, according to Samuel Johnson. Their intention to reinstate the previous order in Oyo was their second goal (Johnson, 1973: 427).

In addition, by gaining political control over the towns in the Osun district, Ibadan was bolstering her position and solidifying her claim to leadership. Ibadan was able to meet these individuals after navigating the Ekitis, Igbominas, and Ijesas. According to some historians, the Ibadan entered Ekiti territory after the Ekiti requested their assistance during the Ilorins' onslaught. Ekiti was under the political control of the Ibadan, who also assigned a delegate to each of its sub-regions, of which Ekiti was one. As a result, each town in Ekiti has a representation from Ibadan. The "baba kekerer" popularly known as the "Ajele system" was the name of these representatives." Indirect rule was used by the Yoruba before colonialism. As a result of Ibadan's victory over Ilorin in several Yoruba towns, control of the region and upkeep of a united policy fell under Ibadan's purview as well. Yet, maintaining control over such a wide area was difficult because of delayed and poor communication. The Ajele system was put in place because Ibadan lacked the resources to have a standing army in each of these towns to protect them against Fulani raids and oversee their efficient operation to ensure their continued allegiance. The Ajele system, which designates an Ibadan resident representative in the subject town, embodies the city of Ibadan's strategy for handling the problem in the administrative system. Each outlying town was given oversight by the metropolitan chief, who was in charge of the town's smooth operation and served as its patron when it came to bringing legal matters before the metropolitan authorities.

II. Review of Literature

Ajele's Approach

The Ajele considered themselves to be the town's protectors and are in charge of making sure that the chiefs' substantial financial benefits from having control over a dependant town are achieved. At least twice a year, Ekiti pays tribute to Ibadan in all kinds of goods, including food, horses, and people in exchange for slaves. Although they were meant to be in charge of overseeing the operation of their message, the Ajele were always required to show deference to the local authority. They always bowed down to the monarch because they had to maintain the notion that he was still the town's chief. Unfortunately, the Ajeles grew corrupt, and an excessive number of Ibadan residents looked to the dependent towns to meet their material requirements. When Ibadan was asked to give up its Ekiti tributaries, for instance, Are Latosa, the leader of Ibadan in the 1870s and 1880s, reportedly responded, "The Ekiti are their wives, yams, palm oil, and slaves." The Ekiti people's resistance is a result of all this economic exploitation, which has had a significant impact on their way of life and makes things difficult (a burden) for them. Their mistreatment was a contributing factor in the Ekitiparapo War (1877–1893). (Soetan, 2005:4).

Ijesa, Ekiti, Igbomina, and Akoko, according to Ibitomi, faced more resolute resistance from the Ibadan than the Osun towns and villages had, and while some Osun

towns had voluntarily submitted to the Ibadan's control, nothing similar had occurred in Ekiti state because it had resisted the Ibadan's control. But, due to Ibadan's superior military structure, the resistance was ineffective. Additionally, Ekiti and Ijesa were free of army incursions and movements while Ibadan was occupied battling Ogun State. The Ijesa declared their independence in response to the Ibadan's obsession. They also made attempts to overthrow the Ibadan in Ekiti and Ijesa towns by annexing towns that were dependent on the Ibadan; however, their triumph was fleeting due to battles between the Ibadan, Ijaye, and Remo (Ibitomi, 2021).

When the Seriki's force first encountered the allies near Ikirun, the Ibadans and Ekitis once more exchanged gunfire. This marked the beginning of the genuine conflict. Following several clashes, the Ekitis started to flee in the direction of Ipole and Igbajo before the Ibadans arrived; this town was empty when the allies arrived. They were pursued by the *seriki* past Igbajo, where he set up camp and cleared the forest's vegetation for miles in the direction of Ipole. Akintaro, the newly minted Osi, and Chief Aderibigbe welcomed him here as another reinforcement from Ibadan. This was sufficient to silence anyone who opposed them for the time being. Although the younger chiefs could battle, they lacked the experience-based wisdom that comes with maturity. The allies unexpectedly attacked the Ibadan in their camp via the opening they had created in the forest, leading the Ibadan to believe that Ogedemgbe had sent reinforcements (S. O. Johnson, 444).

Ogedemgbe was a man of great simplicity. He always kept his promises. He had pledged never to oppose the Ibadans, despite being their sworn adversary, and he still desired to uphold his word. Making Ita Ogbolu his base of operations for the expedition into Igbo-Ani, he sent to Ibadan, where the Are sent him a detachment made up of his slaves and volunteers from among the restless and combative youth of Ibadan. They also gave him a war banner. Ogedemgbe was apprehensive to jump into this fight as a result. Ibadan was seen as a strong neighbour whose power they all dreaded and were determined to smash this time, but he received an invitation from all of the allies as well as from the Egba and Ijebus.

Ogedemgbe, however, eventually gained permission from Ita Ogbolu to retreat, and he occupied the pitch in front of Ekitiparapo to battle the Ibadans. When the Ibadan war chiefs learned of this, they sent home once more for additional reinforcements. On November 3, 1879, the Are despatched the following leaders: Babalola, the son and apparent heir of the late Balogun Ogboriefon; Ojo, the son of the late Bale Opeagbe; and Ogundepo, the Seriki's uncle. The war chiefs believed that the Are deliberately intended to weaken them all one by one to make room for his son to rule over them. This was because, rather than sending a sufficient force that could deal with the entire situation in one blow, he kept sending them in dribbles, promising to each group that whoever emerged victorious would take the lead of the others, inciting jealousy among them. As a result, every newbie was forced to battle alone and was never assisted by those who had previously arrived.

The war chiefs at the seat of war were occasionally hearing about the Aare's son and his slaves and domestic war boys acting inappropriately because they were having too much fun at home and overindulging. The Are's sons and slaves marched out leisurely after them in blazing costumes, but instead of pursuing the enemy, they contentedly camped in the Ibadan farms, feeding on the crops and cutting down standing corn as fodder for their horses. When the Ijebus or Egbas were reported kidnapped in Ibadan farms, war chiefs at home dispatched war chiefs to pursue them (Ibid)

Johnson noted that the war chiefs in the field decided to invite Are himself to the war to take command of the army in person after wasting their strength in the manner described above and being overrun by Aare's sons and slaves, and when he arrived, they were determined to exact revenge on him and his menials for all their impudent acts at home. He sent a message to the king at Oyfor o asking for permission to take the field and return home in 17 days since he had a duty as Kakanfo to answer his people's plea. Knowing that he was determined to go at this time and displayed some of the worst aspects of human nature, the king grudgingly gave his approval. At this point in his career, when his word was the law across Ibadan and its dependencies, he succumbed to flatterers because he believed that nothing was beyond his power to achieve. He undoubtedly believed he would finish the job at hand quickly, but the chiefs who called him to the fight had other ideas. They decided to assuage his haughtiness and exact revenge on Aijenku and Iyapo, in particular the late Seriki, whom he had told to "go to sleep" (S. O. Johnson, 446).

To deliver a devastating blow, the Aare called Ali the Otun Balogun and the late Iyapo's brother Akintola back to Ofa so they could join him at the camp. Akinola arrived in the camp before Ali did, and like each of his forebears before him, he was permitted to engage in battle alone as a young Mogaji. He stood out in the crowd and, by flanking Ogedemgbe, captured him by surprise and released him. He then charged Ogedemgbe with a vicious onslaught. These military leaders wanted to demonstrate their abilities, not to use their victories to the benefit of the opposition. One of Akintola's slaves grabbed Ogedemgbe and shouted, "*Olugun yara oyo nbo*," to him (i.e., captain, be quick, Oyos are coming). The Ijesa were horrified when they hid on which he was reclining, the kegs of gunpowder surrounding him, and all of his charms and amulets were removed, but Akintola departed, and there was no more fighting that day (Ibid).

Yet, this battle had the unintended consequence of spurring the Allies into active planning for a more desperate resistance, especially after they learned that the ARES was approaching. It was said that Ogedemgbe, upon hearing the rumour of the Are's arrival, sent a messenger to enquire as to the veracity of the report and, if true, as to the oath he had taken and for previous favours, he had received from him. He was reportedly pleased to meet in the field a chief who had given him the war standard he was using. As a result, he would withdraw with half of the Ekiti forces, leaving the other half to be easily conquered, and would only pray for his countryman's forgiveness. Ogedemgbe was a trustworthy and honest person. Instead of reciprocating the favour, Aare proudly challenged him to stay if he wanted to share in the fate of those he would soon crush beneath his feet. But, Ogedemgbe sent a different private messenger to meet him at Osogbo on an identical mission out of respect for Are. Is he still there and hasn't left yet? The boy inquired. He will be responsible for the results, I suppose. Ogedemgbe and his fellow citizens were engaged in an independence war. He was ready to give in good faith and kindness, but he was adamant about confronting stubborn resistance with threats and defiance.

The Aare passed via Otan on their route to Irehe intending to ambush the Ekitipaarapos from behind, trapping them in the middle of two fires. But, the Ibadan chiefs were enthused and sent an urgent message after urgent message in case their scheme was foiled. Message period through out are now pleading with him to visit them in the camp and take no more action, and they even offered to risk their own lives in the conflict. Ijesa, meantime, was desperate to checkmate Are after learning that he was considering taking a different path. Ogedemgbe brought his well-trained soldiers with him when he left the command to pursue the Are and, if possible, capture him alive. Olubayode, a famous war

leader, remained in command. He was dismayed when the Aare's decided against following his plan, and he missed his game as a result.

Aare Latoosa led the home team out onto the pitch the following day, May 4, 1880. The Ekitiparapo, on the other hand, continued to bolster their forces by luring recruits from the country's periphery behind them, all the way to Egbe, through the Ijesa, Ekiti, Efon, Yagba, and Akoko. The war chiefs fiercely fought to demonstrate their capabilities to him. By exchanging troops, they cemented their alliance with the Ilorins even further. Ijesa sent one Ogunmodede and a sizable troop to the Ilorin camp, and Ilorin despatched Lasebikan and his men to the camp in Ekiti. One could argue that this agreement was a clever manoeuvre by Ilorin to keep a tight hold over Ekiti and prevent them from leaving the alliance even if they wanted to. The allies also enjoyed a significant edge over Ibadan in that they had open access to Benin for ammunition whereas Ibadan had almost no access due to road closures. The titles Kiriji War and Kiriji Camp were inspired by long flintlock cannons with huge muzzles that were imported from Benin. When fully loaded and fired, these guns emitted a report that resonated from hill to hill all around and sounded like "ki-ri-ji-i" (Oyeweso, 2012).

The Sanusi pulled down the standing corn surrounding the camp to create a way for his tent as starvation swiftly spread among the Ibadans as a result of the blocked road to Ibadan and the depletion of the supplies they had brought from home. and While the allies have enough in town, the common soldiers must now survive on palm nuts, some edible roots, and whatever else they can find in the jungle (Ibid).

Aare emphasised his resolve to see the fight conclude as quickly as possible. He moved the camp to the spot where he had sat during his first battle and gave it the name Elebolo because the area was rich in the herb Ebolo. The Ekiti departed Oke-Imesi and set up camp where Babalola fought his three illustrious fights so that both camps faced one another and were surrounded by lofty mountains, deep ravines, and jagged rocks as a sign of their will to resist him. It appeared that God had purposefully placed both armies into this filth to correct them. The situation for the Ibadans was worse than for the Ekiti mountaineers in their home mountains on the day of the fight since there was no area for them to deploy. The confrontations increased in frequency and ferocity, and the Ibadans lost one or more illustrious war chiefs in each conflict. On May 18 in Kupolu, there was a clash of the chiefs that resulted in the death of the infantry commander in the Are's bodyguard and the fatal wounding of Akintaro the Osi Balogun. On June 1st, Opehinde, one of the last chiefs in command of the town, passed away. Ajenigbe the Ekerin was fatally wounded on June 11 and passed on the next day. The Origins of the Ekiti-Parapo War On August 31, a bloody fight was fought at Kiriji with significant losses on both sides; consequently, for a while, a serious war took place almost every day with terrible losses on both sides for 16 years (Oyeweso, 2012).

2.2 The Roots of the Ekiti-Parapo War

The majority of the Yoruba confederate forces were made up of Western Yorubas (Ibadan and its allies) and Eastern Yorubas (Ijeshas and Ekitis).

The Oyo empire's demise served as the war's distant cause, while Ibadan's military output's domineering behaviour towards Yoruba towns and cities served as its immediate cause. Their dominance also gave rise to other causes of the war, such as the need to stop economic exploitation and the corrupted Ajeles (Ibadan representatives).

The Ekiti-Arapa war was caused by a multitude of factors. The personal grudges of Fabunmi towards the Imesi-igbodo representative who lived in Ibadan (Ajele) were the direct causes of the Ekitiparapo conflict. Oyepetun, the Ibadan Ajele at Imesi-igbodo, was infamous for his avarice and wickedness. Many accounts exist regarding which of his atrocities sparked the war. According to one account, Ajele claimed that Oyepetun had sexually abused Falola, Fabunmi's wife, while a different account claimed that the Oyepetun men had taken food and palm wine from a woman who was Fabunmi's friend's wife.

Without a win or loss, the battle dragged on for sixteen years. Nonetheless, the Anglican Church sent two African missionaries, Bishop S. Johnson and C. Philips, to the Ibadan camp at Igbajo as well as the Ekiti parapo camp at Imesi-Ile in 1886 after the British trade on the coast started to suffer the detrimental consequences of the war and complained bitterly. They signed peace agreements with the opposing parties of the conflict and proclaimed Ijesa, Ekiti, Igbomina, and Akoko independent of Ibadan. Moreover, the Yoruba states' trade route from Lagos was reopened (Akintoye, 1969: 581-598).

III. Discussion

3.1 Ekiti Province's War and War Chiefs: Nature and Practice

Many strategies were employed to win the war, and various precautions were taken to defend both the soldier and the citizen. The sound of the rifle that was used to fight the war gave the conflict the common appellation "the Kiriji War". Contrary to the Ibadanes, who had a standing army built by Aare Latoosa and good weaponry and an advanced gun they obtained through the British traders, the Ekiti side had neither a standing army nor a good weapon with which to fight the battle. The Ekiti, on the other hand, produce their indigenous cannons, and when they fire, they always emit a deep sound like *Kirijiji*! As a result of people saying "Ogun kirij," or "Kiriji war," when they heard the sounds, the war lost its well-known name. It was the first conflict in the area to employ these weapons, and the name "Kiriji" is an onomatopoeic term that is supposed to describe the sound of cannons employed by the kt-Parap forces (B. Awe, 1965: 221-230).

The advantage of the steep terrain of the Ekiti towns, according to Awe, was a noteworthy strategy used throughout the conflict. It was noted that throughout the conflict, the hills and mountains around the Ekiti towns provided safety for the locals. At Imesi-Ile, the hills also shielded the bases of the Ekitiparapo soldiers. Also, with the assistance of the herbalist, the Ekiti troops use charms to shield themselves from the Ibadan soldiers' formidable weaponry (B. Awe, 1964:47-60). According to the Yoruba Heritage Association, the commanders and leaders involved in the conflicts were Obadoge Latoosa, Aare Ona Kakanfo of Ibadan, Ajayi Ogboriefon, Babalola Ajayi Kupolu, Ogunmola Bashorun of Ibadan, Balogun Ali of Iwo, and Balogun Ajayi Osungbekun. Fabunmi of Okemesi, later (Yoruba Heritage Association, 2021).

3.2 Seriki Meyaki, Ogedengbe

Ogedengbe was at Igbara Oke when the Kiriji War of 1870 began, according to Adeniji, who named him as one of the warlords who participated in the Ekitiparapo War. The entire Ekiti region didn't start to think the Ijesas were genuinely serious about driving the Ibadans out of their area until Ogedengbe showed up. Ogedengbe was named the "Seriki Meyaki," or the commander-in-chief or generalissimo of the Ijesa/Ekiti Parapo troops or army, as soon as he arrived at Imesi-Ile. Ogedengbe made the initial fight announcement. Although it was a tough battle, the Ibadans had grown exhausted after seven weeks of

conflict, so Ogedengbe encouraged them to send to Ibadan and retrieve their commander, whom they called "Aare Latoosa" (Adeniji, 1998).

3.3 The coming of Aare Latoosa Lubuola

The arrival of Aare Latoosa Lubuola added to Latoosa's military operations as the supreme leader of the 19th century and the head of the Ibadan army. Aare Latoosa settled in Ikirun after arriving for the Kiriji War. Even before leaving Ibadan, he bragged that he would conquer the Ijesas in just three days. He invited Ogedengbe and reminded him of his pledge at Ibadan shortly following the Igbajo War as soon as he arrived at the front lines of the conflict. Ogedengbe rejected him and informed him that he was engaged in the Ijesa National War. At that point, the Ekiti Parapo soldiers were ready to capture Aare Latoosa alive. I wished that the combat had lasted a long period, from sunrise to sunset. The Ijesas, in alliance with the Ekitis, are infamous for being extremely resistant to the Oyo's wishes, so Aare Latoosa was sent from their Igbajo base to Alaafin of Oyo to speak with the citizens of the colonial British Government and find a way to settle the situation in 1884 when the Ibadan troops were agitated. Latoosa warned that if precautions weren't made immediately, the Ijesas would decimate and obliterate the Oyo's formidable army (2021).

3.4 Imesi-Ile: The Jalumi and Kiriji Conflicts' Focal Point

It took around 40 minutes to go from the Confederate camp to Imesi-ile. Igbajo was about a 60-minute walk from the Ibadan camp. On two tall hills that faced one another, the camps were situated. An antiquated road connected Imesi-ile and Igbajo over the camps (Adekanla, Olabisi 1999:2). The area in between the two camps was a valley. The Alapoto stream, which ran through the Confederate camp and the battlefield, and the Fejeboyu stream were the two main water sources for the camps (named because so much blood spilt into the stream that at one time it was not fit to drink during the war). Originally called Eleriko, it nearly divided the camps in half. Confederate troops built bamboo houses. Ibadan became a mud hut once the Confederates introduced long-range firearms. The Confederate camp is home to about 40,000 people (and 60,000 in the Ibwas camp). The wives and children of the warriors made up a sizable number of these. It developed into a typical town. The Confederates worshipped the god of war and iron, Ogun, and had a smithy where they produced and fixed weapons and other supplies for battle (Akinjogbin, 1998)

With the aid of imported cannons and firearms from Hamburg, Germany, the civil war witnessed one of the most technologically sophisticated and successful conflicts in Western Africa.

Weapons were also imported through Benin and the Lagos Port. The Ekiti Paradox also employed several cutting-edge strategies, including the construction of trenches and platoons, the establishment of a spy network with its headquarters at Ilara-Mokin, and the use of animal behaviour and symbolism as signals during the conflict.

3.5 Consequences of the War

- Yorubaland experienced several wars in the nineteenth century that led to desertions, family separations, and other effects.
- Also, it led to a concentration of Yoruba people in numerous Yoruba villages and cities that are still there today.
- Together with its unusual leadership traits, it led to loyalty across kingdoms and the rise of strong leaders like Oluyole, Sodeke, Ogunmola, Kurumi, Latosisa, and Ogedemgbe.

Yoruba kingdoms developed innovative political structures. The republicanism of Ibadan, the military dictatorship of Ijaye, the federalism of Abeokuta, and the confederacy of Ekitiparapo.

As a result of the numerous wars that ensued, the British had an excuse to annexe all of Yorubaland because they were frequently called upon to meddle in Yoruba affairs and end conflicts.

Many of the kingdoms requested British protection after growing weary of these numerous battles. As they were frequently called upon to meddle in Yoruba matters and put an end to hostilities, Yorubaland as a whole. Many of the kingdoms requested British protection as they became weary of these numerous battles.

The most frequently accepted account, meanwhile, is that on the day in issue, Fabunmi was feasting and dancing with his age-grade members and other well-wishers at the Odo-Erinle temple (just outside the town), celebrating his yearly Erinle celebration. But amid his celebration, he received word that some of the palm wine that one of his friends had sent to him as a gift had been taken by the Ajele men. Soon after, a gang of men from the Ajele attacked the shrine with swords, cutlasses, and other weapons while cursing and swearing. They confiscated all the food and palm wine while also attacking Fabunmi's companion (<https://sunnewsonline.com/ekiti-parapo-war>).

In response to the indignation, Fabunmi responded violently, rushing to his residence to arm himself before going to Ajele's house and killing anybody who did not or was unable to evacuate. The Ajel himself then came out to stop him, but Fabunmi had already cut off his head before he could say anything and many others who were brave enough to do so followed Fabunmi that day. The majority of Ajel's messengers and hangers at Okemisi that day were slaughtered by the sword. The remaining Okemisi people from Ibadan left the community. The next day, as word went across all of Ekiti, Ijesa and Igbomina contributed to stoking a fire that had long lain dormant in the hearts of the populace. Faraway places today Ibadan officials and leaders who were known to be affiliated with them were indiscriminately killed, sacrificed to the gods, or sold into slavery throughout Ekiti and Igbomina.

It was said that Fabuni Okemisi left the town that evening in a highly emotional state. He left his wife Falola behind and moved towards his mother's town of Ogotun while wearing his battle garb and carrying his sword at his side. Ologoyun likely sensed disaster. Fabunmi was greeted, but only in the manner, he is accustomed to. After spending a few minutes in the groove, Ologotun summoned his chiefs, and upon their arrival, he announced to them that Fabunmi was travelling to Ido to meet with Olojudo. He laid the issue on the floor at Olojudo's palace and thought about their might against Latoosa. Olojudo then suggested that the Oore of Otun Ekiti be consulted about the situation.

The other kings in the kingdom had some regard for the Oore of Otun. Aside from his advanced age and amiable personality, he ruled the biggest kingdom at the time. Ologotun returned home while Olujudo travelled with Fabunmi when the campaign had reached his palace in Otun. In Oore's palace, Fabunmi and Olojudo encountered Olugbosun of Oye and Onitaji of Itaji more by accident than intent. After they were unable to come to a consensus on the matter, Olugbosun was observed storming out of the palace and yelling angrily, "Enough is enough." He would prefer to resolve a disagreement with Matchet than bring it up with Oore. Oluwagbosun Fajembola is revered in Ekiti, and when he is in a foul mood, no one dares cross him.

When he stormed out of Oores Palace, crying "War!" and "Murder Ibadan!" and "War!" there was an uproar in Otun. The community was in a frenzy when Oluwagbesun's matchet attacked an Ibadan palm wine vendor in the market square. The nearby Ibadans were surrounded and defeated. The line of battle was marked. All the monarchs agreed to go to battle within nine days; only Ado and Ikere abstained throughout. To help Fabunmi, forces were dispatched to Oke-imesi.

About nine days after hearing the news, Latoosa addressed a request to Oke-imesi through his agents to bring him Fabunmi's head in a white calabash. In contrast to Fabunmi, Latoosa was occupied waging war against the Egba and Ijebu while downplaying the approaching cloud in the east. He dared not rest because he knew he had disturbed an owl's nest. All the known warriors in Ekiti, Igbomina, Akoko, and Ijesa were contacted by Fabunmi, who urged them to band together for the last, greatest uprising against the ruler of Ibadan. He communicated with numerous other warlords and warriors, including Aduloju, Okendengbe, and Faboro; Ogunmodede, Arimoso, and Obe at Ilesa; Adeyele at Ila; Oluwatosun at Oye; Esungbayi at Aiyede; and many more. To help the people escape the plague of Ibadan's persecution, he also despatched emissaries bearing lavish presents to all the kingdoms, pleading with them to rise to the occasion. The Igbomina responded quickly, military preparations were made in Ekiti, and the answer was almost favourable. By day, chiefs, troops, and representatives from all around Ekiti, Ijesa, and the Igbomina converged at Oke-Imesi. Renowned herbalists and medicine men from afar and close by were invited to several meetings that were conducted at Oke-Imesi. The gods were worshipped after consulting the Ifa Oracle. The development of the decision was greatly aided by the participation of Ekitiparapo representatives from Lagos in these meetings and their pledges of material and financial support for the conflict (<https://sunnewsonline.com/ekiti-parapo-war>). In the end, a multi-state organisation known as Ekitiparapo developed; the "Lagos men" are likely responsible for bringing this name into the interior. Oaths were taken, uniting the confederacy's members to fight until Ibadan's influence in the eastern Yoruba nations had been completely eradicated. The main force of the Confederacy invaded Igbajo in August by marching through Imesi-Ile from Oke-Imesi. "Ekitiparapo or Kiriji War" broke out.

Although historians believe that the losses were equal, the conflict was reported to have lasted for roughly 16 years and resulted in significant casualties on both sides. The battle also displayed the broadest selection of military equipment in Western Africa. According to legend, the Eastern Yoruba confederacy bought numerous cannons that fired the deafening "Kiriiiiiii" sound. The vibrations that accompanied the use of the cannons gave them the name "Kiriji," and they gave the Eastern Yorubas an edge over the Ibadans. The scorched-earth strategy of the civil war is thought to have entirely wiped out several Yoruba towns and villages. Other towns are Osogun (located somewhere in Oyo) and Ijaiye. Aare Latosisa of Ibadan used his designated agents, known as Ajele, to impose unthinkable subjugations on the kingdoms of Ijesa, Ekiti, Igbomina, and Akoko for several years. The Ajeles were dictatorial, tyrannical, despotic, and indulged in excess.

When Ibadan traders travelling from Porto Novo with firearms were ambushed by the Egba in 1877, Ibadan had already become involved in yet another trade war with the Egba and Ijebu. The Ekiti and the Ijesa now have a chance. In 1878, the killing of Ibadan officials in Ijesa, Igbomina, and Ekiti marked the beginning of the uprising against Ibadan control. This sparked a conflict that lasted sixteen long years. Ibadan eventually found itself engaged in combat on five fronts. It confronted the Ekitiparapo, which was commanded by Ogedemgbe, the Seriki of Ijesa, to the east. It fronted the Egba and the Ijebu in the south. In from the north came Ilorin. In 1882, Ife, at last, joined the coalition. At Modakeke, there had long been

conflict between the Ife and Oyo settlers. The conflict, in which Ife was attacked by the Modakeke and their allies from Ibadan and Modakeke attacked by the Ife and Ekiti heightened these tensions.

IV. Conclusion

Nonetheless, the northeast was where most of the combat occurred during the conflict. East of Ikirun, at Kiriji, the armies of Ibadan and Ekitiparapo clashed. The management of the commerce channels was a serious problem. Between Egba, Ijebu, and Ondo, there were three primary routes leading into the interior. Due to the periodic closures of other roads, the Brits had freed up the Ondo route. It evolved into both sides' primary supply line during this conflict. Supplies from Ibadan were able to pass through Ijebu. Ijebu traders disapproved of the conflict, and the Awujale were driven into exile in 1885. Despite this, there were certain restrictions on the free movement of commodities. Profit margins for Ijebu traders were considerable, and they maintained tight control over commerce across the kingdom (S. A. Akintoye, 1969: 581-598).

References

- Adeagbo Akinjogbin, (1998, (eds) War and Peace in Yoruba land, 1793 – 1893.
- Adekanla, Olabisi (1999). Imesi-Ile: The Ancient Kiriji Camp. Ibadan: Peetee Nigeria Ltd. (<https://sunnewsonline.com/ekiti-parapo-war>)
- Adeniji, B. F. (1998). "Ogedengbe: An Ijesha Warrior in the 19th Century". In Akinjogbin, Adeagbo; Akinjogbin, I. A. (eds.). War and Peace in Yorubaland, 1793–1893. Nigeria: Heinemann Educational Books.
- . B. Awe (1965) The End of An Experiment: The Collapse of The Ibadan Empire:1877-1893, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 3, No. 2, Historical Society of Nigeria.
- B. Awe(1964) The Ajele System: (A study of Ibadan Imperialism in the nineteenth century), Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 3, No. 1 (December).
- Ekiti Parapo War, <https://sunnewsonline.com/ekiti-parapo-war> 10th October 2019 in the Southwest magazine.
- Ibitomi Ibiwumi Otunola (2021) Fall of The Oyo Empire: Causes, Consequences And Lessons For Modern-Day Nigeria
- Lubuola (2021) History of Ibadan Part 36: The Reign of Latoosa as the Aare Ona kakanfo. Retrieved 6th March 2023.
- Oyeweso, Siyan (2012) The Kiriji War Saga: The Issues, the Aftermath and the Prospects. Text of the Keynote address delivered at the 126th Anniversary of the Kiriji War under the auspices of Osun State Ministry of Home Affairs, Culture & Tourism in collaboration with Kiriji War Heritage Council, 22nd – 23rd September 2012.
- S. A. Akintoye(1969), The Ondo Road Eastwards of Lagos, c. 1870-95, The Journal of African History, Vol. 10, No. 4, Cambridge University Press
- S.O. Soetan(2005)Studies in Ekiti History Part II, Majab Printer, Ilorin
- S.o. Johnson, the history of the Yoruba (from the earliest time to the beginning of the British protectorate).
- Voice of International Affairs accessed on February 23, 2023.
- Yoruba Heritage Association, 2021, Dallas, Texas.