Reconciling History and Realpolitik: A Win-Win Institutional Framework for Ethiopian Red Sea Access and Eritrean Sovereignty in the Horn of Africa

Abstract

The Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute over Red Sea access represents one of the most consequential geopolitical questions in the Horn of Africa, a region described as a "geopolitical chessboard for both local and global powers." Ethiopia, the world's most populous landlocked country with over 130 million citizens, has been without direct sea access since Eritrea's 1993 secession, with 95% of its foreign trade dependent on the Port of Djibouti. Yet Eritrea's sovereignty over Massawa and Assab is absolute under international law. This article argues that despite deep historical grievances, particularly the unilateral 1962 dissolution of the UN-mandated federation without popular consent, the contemporary solution lies not in territorial revisionism but in a legally binding, commercially incentivized "win-win" institutional framework. Drawing on UNCLOS Article 125, comparative transit regimes, and regional integration theory, the article proposes a tripartite governance model involving a Joint Port Authority, revenue-sharing mechanisms, and international guarantees that simultaneously secures Ethiopia's economic lifeline and upholds Eritrea's sovereign borders. Economic analysis demonstrates that cooperation could save Ethiopia $300–500 million annually, generate $200–400 million yearly for Eritrea, and expand bilateral trade from $50–100 million to $1 billion by 2030. The article concludes that a win-win agreement is not merely desirable but strategically necessary for regional stability and that the key variable is political will on both sides and constructive international engagement.